誰(shuí)是歐洲的橋梁

原編者按：德國(guó)和法國(guó)是否致力于建立一個(gè)排斥他國(guó)的聯(lián)盟？德國(guó)對(duì)外關(guān)系委員會(huì)（German Council on Foreign Relations）的烏里克-蓋洛特認(rèn)為，她的國(guó)家必須在美國(guó)和法國(guó)之間保持平衡。她還點(diǎn)明德國(guó)在歐洲內(nèi)外發(fā)揮著五重橋梁作用。

歐盟的整體結(jié)構(gòu)以德國(guó)為基礎(chǔ)，持續(xù)進(jìn)行的歐洲計(jì)劃取決于德國(guó)的行動(dòng)——它將保持和放棄哪種橋梁關(guān)系。

選擇

當(dāng)思考法德聯(lián)盟在一個(gè)擴(kuò)張的歐洲前景如何時(shí)，人們不應(yīng)忽略上述基本事實(shí)。本質(zhì)上，這一現(xiàn)實(shí)的存在使德國(guó)的對(duì)外政策不得不在最大限度和范圍內(nèi)保持平衡。

同時(shí)，有些情況如下所述，還保持原狀。首先，在反對(duì)伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的問(wèn)題上，德國(guó)沒(méi)有打破它基本的對(duì)外政策之一，即從不在法國(guó)和美國(guó)之間作出選擇。其次，德國(guó)和法國(guó)若想單獨(dú)為整個(gè)歐洲拿主意，歐盟和美國(guó)之間的關(guān)系就太重要了。

在涉及跨大西洋關(guān)系方面，歐盟需要以一個(gè)整體來(lái)作出反應(yīng)。

歐洲的中心橋梁

德國(guó)在這一不可高估的現(xiàn)實(shí)問(wèn)題中發(fā)揮了中心作用。它一直是，并且仍然是聯(lián)結(jié)現(xiàn)在歐盟內(nèi)外大部分結(jié)構(gòu)的橋梁。

1、作為歐洲地緣戰(zhàn)略的焦點(diǎn)，德國(guó)是一座通向美國(guó)的橋梁。盡管英國(guó)與美國(guó)，以及布萊爾和布什之間存在所謂的"特殊關(guān)系"，這一點(diǎn)仍不容置疑。

保持對(duì)其他方的控制

2、 德國(guó)是一座通向法國(guó)的橋梁。它是唯一能夠全力應(yīng)對(duì)法國(guó)對(duì)自主的強(qiáng)烈要求的國(guó)家，它成功地使法國(guó)介入跨大西洋關(guān)系，并使法國(guó)感到在一個(gè)擴(kuò)張后的歐洲中沒(méi)有被邊緣化。

3、 第三，德國(guó)還是一座通向英國(guó)的橋梁。它使得具有退出傾向的大英王國(guó)步入歐盟一體化的軌道。

4、 德國(guó)還是一座通向與其接壤的東歐的橋梁。

5、 最后，德國(guó)一直是歐盟眾多的小成員國(guó)的調(diào)停者和倡議者。

經(jīng)過(guò)數(shù)年的緊張關(guān)系之后，法德伙伴關(guān)系像以往一樣健康和牢固，這是好事。在2003年10月中旬布魯塞爾舉行的歐盟峰會(huì)上，由希拉克代表施羅德出席會(huì)議是兩國(guó)合作達(dá)到新水平的標(biāo)志。

權(quán)力重新定位

并不是法德聯(lián)盟中的所有東西都會(huì)保持不變。在一個(gè)擴(kuò)張的歐洲，這對(duì)搭擋對(duì)于持續(xù)的成功是關(guān)鍵的，但它們單獨(dú)還不足以做出決策。

法德還需要其它合作伙伴——尤其是英國(guó)——當(dāng)涉及到安全和防務(wù)措施時(shí)。2003年9月在柏林舉行的德法英峰會(huì)上，英國(guó)表示了對(duì)法德防務(wù)新365JT規(guī)劃的興趣，因而此次峰會(huì)特別有前景。

不同的觀點(diǎn)

然而，盡管德法兩國(guó)目前處于蜜月時(shí)期，它們對(duì)歐洲前途的走向可能持有不同觀點(diǎn)，這是最值得我們關(guān)注的。

一方面，歐盟東擴(kuò)從不是法國(guó)政府關(guān)鍵的對(duì)外政策目標(biāo)。另一方面，從90年代初期以來(lái)德國(guó)一直將歐盟在其東部邊界之外的擴(kuò)充視為對(duì)外政策的核心目標(biāo)。

在發(fā)行統(tǒng)一貨幣歐元的過(guò)程中，法德雙方曾經(jīng)不得不共同肩負(fù)起沉重的負(fù)擔(dān)。不同的是，歐盟東擴(kuò)在兩個(gè)國(guó)家的眼中并不必然是一件共同承擔(dān)的任務(wù)。

法德能否真正成功地建立一個(gè)擴(kuò)大和高效的歐盟所需要的組織結(jié)構(gòu)，我們目前還不清楚。

一個(gè)成功的聯(lián)盟？

人們?nèi)孕桁o觀共同的憲法草案能否在不作實(shí)質(zhì)性改動(dòng)的情況下通過(guò)歐盟委員會(huì)——就像法德希望的那樣。

另外，盡管在2002年10月兩國(guó)達(dá)成了農(nóng)產(chǎn)品補(bǔ)貼的諒解，有關(guān)歐盟東擴(kuò)的融資問(wèn)題仍未確定。

前途勝算幾何

更糟的是，法德面臨著長(zhǎng)期而艱難的談判和爭(zhēng)論，以滿足2006年生效的預(yù)算和債務(wù)需要。

一個(gè)目前致力于擴(kuò)大其地緣政治面積的歐盟不能繼續(xù)把它一半的資源花在農(nóng)業(yè)上。

結(jié)果，對(duì)于德國(guó)的核心歐洲政策——?dú)W盟東擴(kuò)，法國(guó)具有使其陷入僵局的決定性能力。1965年法國(guó)曾動(dòng)用力量使歐盟在農(nóng)業(yè)問(wèn)題上陷入僵局。

德國(guó)的兩難問(wèn)題在于，它在歐盟東擴(kuò)問(wèn)題上無(wú)法避免地需要法國(guó)支持，但卻可能承擔(dān)不起法國(guó)的要價(jià)，即它所規(guī)劃的歐盟之內(nèi)的"核心歐洲"（core-Europe）——而這正是法國(guó)所希望的。

我的結(jié)論

根據(jù)上述分析得出三點(diǎn)結(jié)論。第一，由法國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的核心歐洲沒(méi)有成功的機(jī)會(huì)，它甚至?xí)o德國(guó)帶來(lái)嚴(yán)重的危險(xiǎn)。

第二，德國(guó)起到了橋梁建造者和維護(hù)者的作用，其終極目標(biāo)是歐盟的穩(wěn)定，因此它在自己的國(guó)家利益方面沒(méi)有多少回旋余地。

為何美國(guó)的政策事關(guān)緊要?

最后，如果美國(guó)繼續(xù)"忽視德國(guó)"（ ignore Germany）——就像國(guó)家安全顧問(wèn)賴斯（Condoleezza Rice）在報(bào)道曾經(jīng)主張那樣——美國(guó)就采取了一種根本不恰當(dāng)?shù)恼摺?BR>
其實(shí)，事實(shí)正好相反。德國(guó)能否繼續(xù)并且愿意繼續(xù)承擔(dān)五重歐洲橋梁的任務(wù)，將取決于美國(guó)政府的行動(dòng)。

附：原文網(wǎng)址及內(nèi)容

http://www.theglobalist.com/DBWeb/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=3579

Tony Blair - or Germany - as Europe's Bridge?

By Ulrike Guérot | Friday, November 14, 2003

Are Germany and France engaged in an alliance that basically excludes others? Ulrike Guérot, of the German Council on Foreign Relations, argues that her country must stay on a balanced course between the United States and France. She also maps out her country's five-fold bridging function in Europe - and beyond.

The entire structure of the European Union rests upon Germany, and the continuing European project depends on which bridges Germany maintains - and which ones it may possibly decide to abandon.

The choice

When contemplating the future of the French-German alliance in an expanded Europe, one must not lose sight of this basic fact. In essence, it poses the greatest balancing act German foreign policy has ever had to confront.

Meanwhile, the facts remain as follows: First, in opposing the Iraq war, Germany did not break one of its basic foreign policy principles - that is, never to choose between France and the United States.，Second, the relationship between the European Union and the United States is too important for France and Germany to presume that they could single-handedly take on the role of decision-maker for all of Europe.

As far as transatlantic relations are concerned, the European Union needs to respond as a whole.

The central bridge of Europe

Still, Germany has a central role in this matter that cannot be overestimated. It has been - and remains - a bridge that holds together much of the current internal and external structure of the European Union.

1. Germany functions as a bridge to the United States - as a geo-strategic focal point of Europe. This is true despite the "special relationship" between Great Britain and the United States - and Tony Blair and George W. Bush.

Keeping others in check

2. Germany is a bridge to France - as the only nation that can funnel France's urge for independence, successfully involve France in the transatlantic relationship - and make the French feel that they are not being marginalized in an expanded Europe.

3. Germany furthermore functions as a bridge, third, to Great Britain - by keeping the withdrawal-prone kingdom on an integration track.

4. It is a bridge to Eastern Europe, which borders Germany.

5. Finally, Germany has always been a mediator and an advocate for the numerous small EU member states.

After years of tension, the French-German partnership is as healthy and solid as ever, which is a good thing. The representation of Gerhard Schr?der by Jacques Chirac at the EU-Summit in Brussels in mid-October 2003 is symbolic for the new level of collaboration between the two nations.

Relocation of powers

Still, not everything in the French-German alliance will remain as it is. In an expanded Europe, the pair will be crucial for continued success, but Germany and France alone will not be enough to make decisions.

Other coalition partners will be needed - in particular Great Britain - when security and defense measures are concerned. The German-French-British summit in Berlin in September 2003, at which the British voiced interest in the French-German defense initiative, was especially promising.

Differing views

However, the most important concern is that Germany and France - despite their current love affair - may not share similar views on Europe's future.

The Eastern expansion of the EU was never a key foreign policy goal of the French government. Germany, on the other hand, has viewed the growth of the European Union beyond its Eastern border as a quintessential foreign policy objective since the early 1990s.

Unlike the introduction of the common currency, for which both France and Germany had to shoulder heavy burdens, the Eastern expansion of the EU is not necessarily a mutual project in the eyes of the two nations.

It still remains unclear whether France and Germany can really succeed to bring about the institutional structure that is required for an expanded and efficient European Union.

A successful alliance?

For one, it remains to be seen whether the draft for a common constitution will pass the council conference unscathed - as both France and Germany hope it will.

Second, in spite of the compromise on agricultural subsidies reached between the two nations in October 2002, the financing of the expansion remains uncertain.

What the future holds...

To make things worse, France and Germany face long and tough negotiations and debates to accommodate new budgetary and debt requirements taking effect in 2006.

An expanded European Union that is currently working on enhancing its geopolitical dimension cannot continue to spend 50% of its resources on agriculture.

As a result, France has a decisive "deadlocking capacity" over Germany's core concern of European policy: the European Union's eastern expansion. Once before, in 1965, did France use its power to deadlock the EU over questions regarding agriculture.

The German dilemma is that it inevitably needs France for Europe's expansion, but may not be able to pay the high price of a French-designed 'core-Europe' within the European Union - something the French may be hoping for.

My conclusions

A threefold conclusion therefore emerges: First, a core Europe led by France has no chance of succeeding - and even poses grave a danger for Germany.

Second, judging from its role of bridge builder and maintainer, Germany has little maneuvering room for national interests, considering that its ultimate goal is the stability of the European Union.

Why U.S. policy matters

Lastly, the United States would hence choose a fundamentally unsuitable policy if it continued - as National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice reportedly has advocated - to "ignore Germany."

In fact, the opposite is true: It will depend on the actions of the U.S administration whether Germany can sustain - and is willing to remain - in its role as the five-dimensional European bridge.